GREETINGS OF Peace. Kapayapaan. Katoninongan, Paghi-daet. Kalinaw.
Wassalam.
A specter is haunting Asia, the specter of terrorism and with that
the "global war against terrorism." This is the main current
challenge on the peace front, or more precisely the various peace
fronts, in the Philippines. The post-September 11 "global war
against terrorism" has set back or constrained the work for peace
in much the same way as it has set back the work for human rights,
whose day we of course celebrate today. The US-led campaign against
terrorism reflects a drift toward the militarization of the response
to terrorism, and predominance of the military and military solutions
in addressing not only terrorism but also rebellion and internal armed
conflict, which this conference has been convened to discuss both
in its 1988 and 2002 versions. The militarization of the response
to terrorism and rebellion is not just a "dangerous tendency"
but already a "clear and present danger" to peace processes,
to the ways of peace, dialogue, persuasion, inclusion and participation.
In particular, in the Philippines, it is a threat to the viability
of peace negotiations with the various rebel groups.
This is, of course, most clearly demonstrated in the current state
of the Philippine government's peace process with the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP)-New People's Army (NPA)-National Democratic
Front (NDF). With the US designation of the CPP-NPA as a "foreign
terrorist organization" and the Philippine President's welcoming
of this in her Nine-Point Guidelines on the CPP, the "prejudicial
question" has been raised by the hawks in high circles: "why
are we negotiating with the CPP-NPA when we have declared them a terrorist
organization?" The simplistic logic is this: The policy is we
do not negotiate with terrorists; the CPP-NPA has been declared a
terrorist organization; ergo, we do not negotiate with the CPP-NPA.
It is not as simple as that in reality but this logic appears to have
won the policy battle, at least on the level of the executive branch
of government.
The logic of that policy, which naturally leads to the downgrading
or even scrapping of peace negotiations in favor of military offensives
or "all-out war," must be challenged, if no longer in the
Cabinet then in Congress. Even the premise that "we do not negotiate
with terrorists" must be challenged. I am talking not so much
about whether the CPP-NPA is really terrorist. I am talking against
the absolutist position of no negotiations with terrorists. Perhaps
the best current counter-example is the new, ongoing Sri Lanka peace
process with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE
has long been designated by the US as a "foreign terrorist organization."
Yet, without lifting this designation, the US itself has expressed
support for the Sri Lanka peace process. In Sri Lanka, as with the
Philippines, there is a history, including a history of peace negotiations,
that cannot just be disregarded. In the case of the Philippine government
and the NDF, there has been already a decade of on-and-off peace negotiations,
maybe more off than on, but which have at least produced a Comprehensive
Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law (CARHRIHL).
In the light of this recent history and rich resource of experience
in peace negotiations not only with the NDF but also the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), Cordillera People's Liberation Army (CPLA),
Rebolusyonaryong Alyansang Makabansa (RAM), Alyansang Tapat sa Sambayanan
(ALTAS), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Rebolusyonaryong
Partido ng Manggagawa (RPM) all of which, incidentally, have been
called "terrorist" at one time or another, a question like
"why are we negotiating with the CPP-NPA?" should no longer
even be asked.
There are doves in the Cabinet like the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (PAPP) who, to his credit, has tried to maneuver within
the constraints of the President's Nine-Point Guidelines by nuancing
the matter: "On the issue of terrorist groups, government has
adopted a policy of not dealing or negotiating with such criminal
groups whose main motivation is neither political, ideological or
religious. Therefore, such groups as the Abu Sayyaf, the Pentagon
and other kidnap-for ransom bands are dealt with through military
and police operations. Recently however, the government has had to
review this policy in the light of the US State Department's recent
designation of the CPP-NPA as a foreign terrorist organization…
The US' action must be seen in the context of the US role in spearheading
the global campaign against terrorism and of the CPP-NPA issue as
an internal matter which must be addressed through our own internal
policy. In a 9-point policy guide on dealing with this issue, the
government stated that while it condemns the acts of the CPP-NPA which
constitute terrorist acts and demands that these acts cease immediately,
open communication lines however shall continue to be maintained in
pursuance of the peace efforts with the said organization." There
is a small window of opportunity here for those who would advocate
the primacy of peace negotiations over military action in dealing
with the major rebel groups, not just the CPP-NPA-NDF but also the
MILF.
But, as we said earlier, the hawks appear to have won the policy
battle against the doves at the Cabinet level and, most importantly,
with the President who has already laid down the hard line, which
has not been softened even for Christmas. The lead hawk, namely the
Secretary of National Defense, who justifiably prides himself as a
thinking general, to his credit, has sharpened the policy and public
debate on this matter by articulating some sophistication in his arguments,
for example, that sometimes we have to wage war to have peace"
(incidentally, a line shared by the NDF), that the peace negotiations
are useless "for the past 10 years, and nothing is happening,"
that "we are for peace, but we are not in favor of negotiations
that are interminable," and so on. Have these really become the
superior arguments or ideas in the policy and public debate? One current
challenge on the peace front is to engage and win the argumentation
on the merits of the issue, and this requires some counter-sophistication.
The struggle for peace is also a struggle of ideas. Martin Ennals,
in his major paper on "International Conflict Resolution"
delivered at the 1988 International Conference on Conflict Resolution
in the Philippines, saw fit to quote these words from the UNESCO Charter:
"Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of
men that the defenses of peace must be created."
At another, more comprehensive or encompassing level, the "global
war against terrorism" has reinforced an already dominant or
hegemonic ideology of national security, particularly its thrust of
counter-insurgency as the framework to address insurgency or rebellion.
The peace process has become subsumed under a national or internal
security framework. The peace negotiations in particular, through
the PAPP, have been subject to the Cabinet Oversight Committee (COC)
on Internal Security created by Executive Order No. 12 with a counter-insurgency
"Strategy of Holistic Approach." A truly holistic approach
called the "Six Paths to Peace," currently institutionalized
in Executive Order No. 3 defining policy for government's comprehensive
peace efforts, has in effect been undermined. This includes the third
"path to peace" which is "peaceful, negotiated settlement
with the different rebel groups."
At one level, the national security framework must be challenged
and debunked once and for all as a framework of governance. The basic
concept of national security as "the state or condition wherein
the people's way of life and institutions, their territorial integrity
and sovereignty including their well-being are protected and enhanced,"
on its face, would tend to exclude other ways of life and institutions
such as those of the Bangsamoro (Moro nation) as well as alternative
social systems like socialism. The concept lacks a sense of history
and tends to focus in its operationalization on preserving the status
quo from various perceived threats or threat groups. There is a need
for a counter-hegemonic framework for governance and development that
would better address rebellion and its root causes. Off-hand, human
rights, human security, peace and development, conflict resolution
and peace-building, conflict transformation any of these would be
a better framework for addressing internal armed conflict.
A little more must be said about human rights as a possible policy
framework because it is, after all, Human Rights Day, and because
Martin Ennals highlighted human rights with quotes from the UN instruments
all throughout his 1988 major paper on International Conflict Resolution."
His very starting quote from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
"Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression,
that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." Uncannily
and succinctly shows both the roots of rebellion and the best legal
regime to address it. Human rights can be a framework not only for
governance and development but also for conflict resolution and peace-building.
After all, peace is a human right, going by the bold declaration of
global civil society in its Hague Appeal for Peace 1999.
At another level, the "Six Paths" framework for a comprehensive
peace process must be defended from the inroads of the national security
framework. The "Six Paths" framework formulated in 1993
is still the best framework for the peace process so far not only
because of its comprehensiveness but also because it was the product
of a process of nationwide consultation and consensus-building under
the auspices of the National Unification Commission, thereby enjoying
a broad spectrum of support both inside and outside of government.
This is supposed to be government's peace policy but it has been embodied
only in executive orders, which lapse with each new President or which
may be revoked by any President anytime. Government policy on such
matters of life and death to the nation like war and peace surely
must be embodied in laws, which all Presidents have the sworn duty
to faithfully execute. It is about time that peace be declared a national
policy through a national peace policy act of Congress, the highest
regular national policy-making authority under the Constitution. One
current effort along this line is Senate Bill No. 1451 of the Chairperson
of the Senate Committee on Peace, National Unification, and Reconciliation
which would create a Commission on Peace (or we can call it a Commission
on the Peace Process or CPP for short).
The policy battle on dealing with the CPP-NPA-NDF may be over in
the Cabinet but the battle should be brought to the Congressional
arena where it should be carried out as part of deliberations on a
national peace policy act, including whatever necessary Congressional
investigations and public hearings in aid of legislation. So much
the better if the Congressional debate becomes a national debate where
there is people's participation in peace policy-making.
Peace needs its allies, whether strategic or tactical, and there
is one in no less than the Speaker of the House of Representatives
who does have a track record in the peace negotiations with the NDF.
He and a good number of representatives have supported a House resolution
calling for the immediate resumption of formal peace talks with the
NDF and the MILF.
But it is no longer enough now to call for the immediate resumption
of peace talks. The on-and-off, up-and-down talks will just keep repeating
themselves if there are no paradigm shifts on both sides. I am not
talking about junking framework agreements like the Hague Joint Declaration
with the NDF and the Tripoli Peace Agreement with the MILF. By all
means, honor all such agreements. I am talking about, on one hand,
the government casting aside a counter-insurgency orientation which
seeks to impose a peace settlement, and on the other hand, the rebel
side casting aside a framework of engaging in peace talks for mere
tactical or organizational gains. There is an urgent need here for
a decisive break with old bad habits something which is, of course,
always a challenge.
It is also no longer enough now to call for a Christmas ceasefire
which, incidentally, was pioneered as a People's Christmas Ceasefire
at the 1988 version of this conference as breaking new ground for
peace. This is now old ground in the GRP-NDF peace process. Breaking
truly new ground here calls for nothing less than breaking the decade-old
"talk and fight" mode of no ceasefire during peace talks
which mode both sides have affirmed and reaffirmed to this day. It
is no longer enough to just call for the implementation of the CARHRIHL
which would presumably guarantee "a considerable reduction of
violence" but the fighting goes on. The continued fighting itself
goes against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Hague Joint Declaration
which stipulates "specific measures of goodwill and confidence-building
to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations." The "end
of hostilities" is supposed to come at the end of the process
but this does not necessarily preclude an interim ceasefire. After
trying the "talk and fight" mode for more than a decade,
both sides must be challenged to give an interim ceasefire a chance,
to give it at least one decade also, for the sake of the people and
of the process itself, with the best possible safeguards. This could
create its own positive dynamic, including foreseeable peace dividends
bringing concrete benefits to the people which in turn generates support
for the peace negotiations. The challenge to peace advocates is to
make a good case for an interim ceasefire, considering that both sides
have their respective established positions against this.
Thus far, we have been dealing mainly with questions of war and peace
policy which is partly a struggle of ideas. It is also partly, in
fact mainly, a struggle of motive forces, of political support. The
President drives home this point everytime she challenges peace advocates
by asking where is the peace constituency, claiming a war constituency
of 95% against the resumption of peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF.
Peace advocates should take this challenge more seriously. One idea
is to consciously and systematically work towards a peace vote at
the next general elections, whatever year this is held and for whatever
form of government. The idea, first and last tried in the 1992 general
elections, is to elect leaders whose track record and program are
good for the peace process. We all know this is easier said than done.
Where will the peace votes and the peace campaigners come from? Where
have all the peace advocates gone? The Philippine peace movement has
admittedly lost some ground in peace-constituency building because
of past and current failures or loss of momentum in peace negotiations,
agreements and implementation. As we indicated at the start, the "global
war against terrorism" with its militarization of the response
has further eroded or weakened the work for peace as well as its constituency.
Ironically, this crisis is also an opportunity for the peace movement
to regain lost ground because war also gives occasion to its own anti-thesis,
peace. The intensification and internationalization of internal armed
conflicts has given rise to some new peace alliances (another kind
of NPA) for example, "Gathering for Peace" to oppose US-led
wars of aggression and military intervention, and "All-Out Peace
Groups" to support peace negotiations over "all-out war"
with the main rebel groups. And remember it was the Vice President
as then Secretary of Foreign Affairs who linked those two concerns
when he was able to get the US to agree that the RP-US "Balikatan"
joint military exercises shall not affect the progress of ongoing
peace negotiations with the NDF and MILF.
Below the relatively quiet surface of the peace constituency are
the increasingly active efforts at peace advocacy, peace education,
peace research, peace zone-building and other community-based peace
initiatives, especially in Mindanao. One interesting NPA (i.e. new
peace alliance) there is the Mindanao Peoples' Peace Movement (MPPM)
which is advocating a U.N.-supervised referendum as a peaceful and
democratic process of determining political options in Muslim Mindanao.
Martin Ennals was prophetic in his "Summary Review: Closing Statement"
at the 1988 conference: "Perhaps the people's revolution of 1986
can be decentralized. With the confidence of the past, the Filipino
people can reject violence as a means of achieving peace and assert
themselves and their authority over the life and death of their citizens,
and the future of their children." Peace workers have indeed
acted locally, and usually more effective at that than when acting
nationally. Their separate but interrelated and collective efforts
at various levels, in various peace fronts, are a source of hope that
eventually a critical mass consolidated into a strengthened peace
movement will turn the tide in favor of peace.
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This is a paper prepared for a conference on "Waging Peace in
the Philippines: Looking Back, Moving Forward" held December
10-12 at the Ateneo de Manila University in Quezon City.
