v 23.0
Nobyembre 15-30, 2002  
Home
About us
Archive
Links
Feedback
Contribute
Forums
Guestbook
PAHAYAG
Position on the MLSA/RP-US-01

By the US Troops Out Now! Coalition (OUT NOW!)
November 27, 2002

After the closure of our bases in the Philippines in 1992, the US has benefited from a series of access agreements and other arrangements with Southeast Asian partners that have supported continued US military engagement. These arrangements, including port calls, repair facilities, training ranges and logistics support, have become increasingly important to our overseas presence…
-- US Military Strategy in East-Asia Pacific, 1998


The Philippines may be used as a staging area for US military operations should the US initiate involvement in the Pacific or the Mideast.|
-- Admiral Charles Larson, Commander of Pacific Fleet, 1993

Shroud of Secrecy and Deceit
The "Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (RP-US-01) Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines" (MLSA/RP-US-01) was signed last November 20, 2002 by an AFP star-rank officer and a US Army colonel representing the USCINCPAC in the Philippines. After ten years of angling for an access and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with the Philippines, the US finally got what it wanted, albeit under a shroud of secrecy and deceit.

"Mutual Logistics Support Agreement" (MLSA/RP-US-01) is nothing more than a repackaged ACSA. The US has widely resorted to ACSAs and status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), like the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), with various countries to provide the legal terms and framework by which they could deploy military forces and materiel in different parts of the world to protect and promote US interests. ACSAs and SOFAs became especially expedient after many of the US military bases on foreign soil were closed down in the post-Cold War period.

In many countries, the process by which the ACSAs and SOFAs are negotiated and the final terms of the agreements are shrouded in secrecy, not so much because of strategic or tactical value or sensitivity but because of controversy arising from serious questions with regard to national policy, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The MLSA/RP-US-01 is no exception. Its predecessor immediately met with protest the first time it was announced in November 6, 1992—barely a year after the Clark and Subic bases were shut down. The announcement was made by then AFP Chief-of-Staff Gen. Lisandro Abadia and USCINCPAC Admiral Larsen that US forces would once again have access to Philippine ports and airfields. In 1997 it was reported that Pres. Ramos had secretly entered into an ACSA with the US. A few months back, word leaked out that AFP COS Gen. Villanueva had signed the MLSA/RP-US-01 with the USCINCPAC representative. In all cases the issue simmered down after the US and Philippine governments backtracked and denied that any final agreement had been entered into.

Both the US and Philippine governments attempt to downplay the MLSA/RP-US-01 as a "mere accounting agreement". But the controversy, which marked the entire process, and attempts by both governments to squelch dissent over the past ten years, completely belies this claim. The underhanded manner by which the MLSA/RP-US-01 had been finalized and signed could only incite the very controversy both governments seek to avoid. Sec. Reyes's admission that Congress was not briefed before the signing because "it might trigger debates" provides prima facie evidence that such underhandedness was a calculated move aimed at producing a fait accompli.

Clearly, all this did not happen just to produce a "boring", "accounting agreement".

Dragging the Philippines into US Wars and Military Adventures
The MLSA/RP-US-01 is in truth an Agreement that will commit and help drag our country into blindly supporting US military actions, including wars of aggression and military intervention in Asia and elsewhere.

The MLSA/RP-US-01 describes itself in Article I as an agreement "for the purpose of establishing basic terms, conditions, and procedures to facilitate the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services". But it is evident from the contents of the succeeding Articles that the basic terms, conditions, and procedures described herein include but is not limited to accounting terms, conditions and procedures.

In conjunction with the VFA, the MLSA/RP-US-01 is aimed at reestablishing and reinforcing US military presence in the country and in the Southeast Asian region. Both the VFA and MLSA/RP-US-01 are necessary for continued US intervention in the Philippines and US power-projection in Southeast Asia.

The VFA provides the legal framework for stationing US troops in the country and providing them immunity from legal suits. The MLSA/RP-US-01 provides the framework for securing the logistic support, supplies and services for US forces stationed in the country and the region; in short, for the establishment of foreign military facilities anew short of returning the former US bases.

In effect, the MLSA/RP-US-01 will decisively overturn the historic 1991 Senate decision terminating US military presence on Philippine soil. It flouts the constitutional provision that specifies that such kinds of agreements on US military presence, i.e. foreign troops, facilities and bases, require concurrence by two thirds of the Philippine Senate.

Thus Article II of the MLSA/RP-US-01 which states that "(t)his Agreement and any implementing Arrangements executed hereunder shall be implemented, applied and interpreted by the Parties in accordance with the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement or the Military Assistance Agreement and their respective constitutions, national laws and regulations" is a farcical provision.

In the first place, the MDT itself is a relic of the Cold War, and contemplates a situation where the Philippines or US interests in the Pacific would be attacked by the Soviet Union or China. There is currently no threat of external attack on the Philippines, much less the US, for the MDT to be of any relevance or application. (In the case of the Spratleys, the US maintains a policy of neutrality and keeping the sea-lanes free. It will not side with the Philippines in case any of the other claimant countries threaten or attack the islands claimed and occupied by the Philippines).

The VFA itself is vague about the nature and duration of activities that US forces are allowed to engage in. In our experience, these combined exercises or Balikatan can be a series of exercises the whole year round wherein a single exercise can last up to 6 months It can also result in "stay-behind" US forces such as those currently still in Basilan and other parts of Western Mindanao for so-called humanitarian activities. Defense Secretary Gen. Angelo Reyes, in a display of pique during the debates on Balikatan 02-1 said, "Even fifty years is temporary."

All talk about operations and deployments being "in accordance with the… MDT, the VFA or MAA and respective constitutions" is nothing but a charade.

Beyond MDT and VFA, Grossly Unconstitutional

The MLSA/RP-US-01 clearly goes beyond the purview of the MDT and even of the VFA and by no stretch of the imagination can it be treated as an executive agreement that does not need Senate concurrence.

The Agreement defines the scope or applicability of "approved activities" wherein said logistical support, supplies and services shall be reciprocally provided by both Parties. These activities however go beyond the purview of the Constitution and existing treaties.

1. There appears to be a delimiting factor in that only activities "(d)uring combined exercises and training, operations and other deployments undertaken under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement or the Military Assistance Agreement as agreed upon between the Parties" are covered by the agreement. (Art III, Sec 1-a).

However Art III, Sec 1-a is worded vaguely enough to circumvent limitations imposed or implied by existing bilateral agreements. The reference to "operations and other deployments" makes the qualification ill defined and open-ended.

It should be pointed out that under current US military doctrine, strategy and tactics, its military forces anywhere outside the US and US territories are assigned a wide variety of "operations" (categorized as "stability operations"). The overriding common objective of these operations is to establish and project overwhelming US military dominance in the region to deter potential rivals and fight and decisively defeat them where deterrence fails.

The Arroyo government, having projected itself as the staunchest ally and supporter of the Bush "war on terror," has no qualms rushing headlong to fight America's 'wars. As in Balikatan 02-1, this mind set has led to wanton and wholesale violations of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The propensity of US and Philippine governments and armed forces to stretch the parameters of the MDT and VFA way beyond their scope and meaning is borne out by past and recent experience.

A case in point is the recent Balikatan-02-1 that was spuriously described as a "field training exercise" (FTX) despite the use of live ammunition, staging the exercise in actual combat areas, and engaging in actual combat operations against the Abu Sayyaf. The entire activity was misrepresented as being covered by the MDT despite the clear fact that the Abu Sayyaf does not represent an external threat except by the questionable resort to conferring it tenuous links with the Al Qaeda and other purported terrorist groups.

2. In another section of Art. III, Sec 1-b, the MLSA/RP-US-01 speaks of "(o)ther cooperative efforts, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and rescue operations, and maritime anti-pollution operations within Philippine territory, or outside in cases where either Party, or both, have decided to participate. (Art III, Sec 1-b.)

Worse, the above article provides for and opens the floodgates to Philippine involvement in all sorts of US military adventures whether they be open declarations of war, as in the impending US war on Iraq, or couched in terms of "humanitarian assistance, rescue operations, etc." since the only qualifier for these "other cooperative efforts within Philippine territory, or outside Philippine territory" is that "either Party, or both, have decided to participate."

On the other side, the MLSA/RP-US-01 opens the door wide open to unhampered US military presence and armed intervention in internal armed conflicts. A concrete case is the recent military campaign against the Abu Sayyaf, and the repeated pronouncements of the highest Defense and Security officials practically inviting US forces to participate in military campaigns against the New Peoples Army and Moro Islamic Liberation Front. US military doctrine likewise provides for such involvement termed as "Foreign Internal Defense Operations".

Seen in this light, not only does the MLSA/RP-US-01 have no legal basis whatsoever in any existing bilateral agreement, it is grossly violative of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity and the Philippine Constitution.

The MLSA/RP-US-01 intrudes on national policy-making with wide-ranging and profound consequences. At the very least it requires being subjected to public scrutiny and debate and ratification by the Senate, rather than negotiated and entered into by the Defense Departments of the Philippine and US governments in secret.

Virtual Basing
The MLSA/RP-US-01 will allow the US to access military facilities and services in the country, which will give it the necessary freedom of movement in pursuing its current regional and global military objectives. The Philippines continues to play a key role in US geo-political strategy due to its geographic location and its long history of "special relations" with the US as a compliant ally. The indecent haste with which the MLSA/RP-US-01 was concluded is necessitated by the logistic requirements of the US, e.g. storage, billeting and refueling stations, in its impending war on Iraq.

The Agreement defines logistic support and services to include "billeting, transportation (including airlift), communication services, medical services, operations support (and construction and use of temporary structures incident to operations support)… (Article IV, Section a-2)

The qualifiers that "storage services (for US weapons and supplies) shall at all times be under the control and supervision of the host state" and that structures should be "temporary" are meant to circumvent the constitutional prohibition on US facilities. They do not diminish the basic character of the MLSA/RP-US-01 as an agreement that allows the provision of the same logistical support that a regular US military base hitherto provided.

The final agreement also has a provision that "(n)o US military base, facility or permanent structure shall be constructed or allowed under the agreement" (Article IV Sec.2).

Whether the US will be allowed to construct temporary or permanent structures, is not the issue anymore. The US will be allowed to set up structures that they can use for the duration of "combined exercises and training". As noted earlier, these combined exercises can occur the whole year round, one after the other.

The provision prohibiting "permanent military structures" is rendered useless when taken in the context of prolonged, continuous joint military exercises. Another way of putting it: as long as there are exercises, the US can maintain their "temporary" structures. Aside from building their own structures, US forces will already be allowed access to existing Philippine facilities, making them de facto US military facilities.

One-sided and Open-ended
The accord states that should there be any disagreement between the Parties these shall not be referred to any international body or third party (Article VIII Sec.1). Disagreements will have to be resolved by the two Parties themselves.

This places the country at a grievous disadvantage, given the grossly unequal relations between the Philippines and the US, and given the latter's track record of unilateralism, violations of international laws as well as military abuses. This is a clear case of US bullying and flaunting its lone superpower status.

Concretely, the Philippines will not be able to raise future violations of the MLSA/RP-US-01 to international venues like the United Nations or any of its agencies, the International Court of Justice or the International Criminal Court.

Take note that the Parties to the MLSA/RP-US-01 are the Department of Defense of the USA and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines. This puts the Armed Forces of the Philippines in charge of Philippine Foreign policy. It must be pointed out that the Philippine military is one of the most colonially-oriented institutions of government given its long, continuous history of being trained and armed by the US with the top-level Defense and AFP officials being wooed, wined and dined, by the US military establishment.

How is it that an agreement with significant defense and foreign policy implications are left to the sole discretion of military officers?

The MLSA/RP-US-01 rides roughshod over safeguards and limitations imposed by treaties and Philippine constitutional & legal processes. It is idle to talk about "control and supervision of the host state" without explicit provisions… and when the Philippine government readily submits to US positions (e.g. VFA non-inspection of vessels and surrender of judicial jurisdiction over violations of Philippine law committed by US troops in Philippine territory).

Should there be any violations and damage to property or human life, the US can always invoke the VFA whereby the Philippines will surrender criminal jurisdiction over US troops who have committed violations.

While the agreement prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons (Article III Sec.5), there is no provision, which prohibits the entry and storage of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, nor is there any provision, which allows the inspection of these weapons in US vessels. The agreement already assumes compliance with existing Philippine laws that prohibit the entry, storage and projection from Philippine territory of nuclear weapons.

The open-endedness of the MLSA/RP-US-01 is further underscored by Art. V, Sec. 3 which says that "An Implementing Arrangement under this Agreement may be negotiated on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense by Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) … (and) the Department of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines by General Headquarters, Armed Forces of the Philippines". This reveals that MLSA/RP-US-01 is indeed only the beginning since "implementing arrangements" are still to follow, negotiated and signed only by defense and/or military officials and likely not to be revealed much less brought to the attention of the public.

In Art. V, Sec. 1 on the terms and conditions of the agreement, while the provision begins by saying that "(e)ach party shall exert best efforts, consistent with national priorities, to satisfy requests from the other Party under this Agreement…" it ends with the following: "When an Implementing Arrangement contains a stricter standard for satisfying such requests, it shall apply over this paragraph." This provision can be interpreted as mandatory and invoked by the US to demand the satisfaction of certain logistical support requirements.

Reciprocal provisions in the agreement give the Philippines the opportunity to also avail of logistics support from the US. Of course, that is assuming that the Philippines would want to go all the way to the other side of the globe to have its ships repaired and refueled and its personnel billeted in US military facilities. Realistically speaking, the Philippines will not likely make use of this reciprocal provision since it does not conduct large-scale overseas military operations, which would require the hosting of US military bases. For all intents and purposes, the MLSA/RP-US-01 will benefit only the US military.

US Power Projection and Military Intervention
After the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, the US government has stepped up its drive for war and hegemony, which included the bombing of Afghanistan and military incursions in Central Asia and the Middle East. Using the specter of terrorism as a convenient justification, the US is trying to expand and protect its imperialist interests and heighten the exploitation and oppression of the peoples of the world.

Taken in the context of the US "war against terror" and announcements from the US State Department declaring the Communist Party of the Philippines-NPA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the MLSA/RP-US-01 is an instrument for US military intervention in the domestic affairs of the Philippines. The MLSA/RP-US-01 will allow the US military to have a stable and flexible forward presence in the country and the region, and at less cost compared to maintaining the usual US basing structures like Clark and Subic.

The MLSA/RP-US-01 should also be viewed in the light of the recently concluded US-sponsored ASEAN anti-terror pact which aims to strengthen security cooperation against "terrorism" in defense of US interests in Southeast Asia. The MLSA/RP-US-01 will make the Philippines a staging ground for US "stability operations" (military intervention) in Southeast Asia. It is a reprise of the role played by Clark and Subic during the Vietnam and Korean Wars.

We also have to be wary about Article VIII Sec.3 that, in effect, authorizes classified activities or operations under the agreement. This is cleverly done in the guise of disallowing classified-level transactions while incorporating the qualifier "(u)nless specifically authorized by separate agreement or arrangement…" This could very well be used by the US to launch covert operations in the country, something that the US is certainly capable of doing.

With the VFA and MLSA/RP-US-01 in place, the US is fast regaining the privileges it enjoyed during the period of US military bases in the country. Though short of having formal bases, the US is hoping to expand its presence and engagement in the Philippines and the region.

Call ti All Patriotic Filipinos

The MLSA/RP-US-01 is a grossly one-sided agreement aimed at expanding US military engagement and presence in the country. The public has been hoodwinked several times over by the Arroyo administration's failure to provide full public disclosure regarding the agreement. The historic verdict of the people, as expressed by the Senate's decision to junk the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, has been reversed by the executive and by a handful of militarists in the administration.

National sovereignty and territorial integrity are being sold out in exchange for vague promises of paltry sums of economic and military aid, which are not even provided for in the Agreement, and for continued US backing for the incumbent regime. Thanks to the shameless and flagrant puppetry of the Arroyo government, our country has been virtually reduced to Uncle Sam's Southeast Asian colonial outpost for US interventionist wars.

All patriotic Filipinos must unite and resolutely oppose the MLSA/RP-US-01. There is nothing mutual in this Agreement, absolutely nothing.

The Arroyo government should be held responsible and be made accountable for signing this grossly disadvantageous Agreement and for surrendering national sovereignty. Thus Pres. Arroyo has made it so much easier for the country to be dragged into wars not of our making and not to our national interest. Vice versa the Arroyo government must be held accountable for thus exposing our people to attacks directed at the US, its forces and installations.

Let us uphold the people's aspirations for national sovereignty and a truly independent foreign policy. Let us oppose increasing US armed intervention in and impositions on our country.

For comments and reactions to this article, please visit Tinig.com Forums.

Back to Main page
 


Copyright © 2002 Tinig.com
All rights reserved