PAHAYAG
Position on the MLSA/RP-US-01
By the US Troops Out Now! Coalition (OUT NOW!)
November 27, 2002
After
the closure of our bases in the Philippines in 1992, the US has
benefited from a series of access agreements and other arrangements
with Southeast Asian partners that have supported continued US military
engagement. These arrangements, including port calls, repair facilities,
training ranges and logistics support, have become increasingly
important to our overseas presence…
--
US Military Strategy in East-Asia Pacific, 1998
The Philippines may be used as a staging area for US military operations
should the US initiate involvement in the Pacific or the Mideast.|
-- Admiral Charles Larson, Commander of Pacific Fleet, 1993
Shroud
of Secrecy and Deceit
The "Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (RP-US-01)
Between the Department of Defense of the United States of America
and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of the Philippines"
(MLSA/RP-US-01) was signed last November 20, 2002 by an AFP
star-rank officer and a US Army colonel representing the USCINCPAC
in the Philippines. After ten years of angling for an access
and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) with the Philippines, the
US finally got what it wanted, albeit under a shroud of secrecy
and deceit.
"Mutual
Logistics Support Agreement" (MLSA/RP-US-01) is nothing more
than a repackaged ACSA. The US has widely resorted to ACSAs and
status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), like the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA), with various countries to provide the legal terms and framework
by which they could deploy military forces and materiel in different
parts of the world to protect and promote US interests. ACSAs and
SOFAs became especially expedient after many of the US military
bases on foreign soil were closed down in the post-Cold War period.
In many countries,
the process by which the ACSAs and SOFAs are negotiated and the
final terms of the agreements are shrouded in secrecy, not so much
because of strategic or tactical value or sensitivity but because
of controversy arising from serious questions with regard to national
policy, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The MLSA/RP-US-01
is no exception. Its predecessor immediately met with protest the
first time it was announced in November 6, 1992—barely a year
after the Clark and Subic bases were shut down. The announcement
was made by then AFP Chief-of-Staff Gen. Lisandro Abadia and USCINCPAC
Admiral Larsen that US forces would once again have access to Philippine
ports and airfields. In 1997 it was reported that Pres. Ramos had
secretly entered into an ACSA with the US. A few months back, word
leaked out that AFP COS Gen. Villanueva had signed the MLSA/RP-US-01
with the USCINCPAC representative. In all cases the issue simmered
down after the US and Philippine governments backtracked and denied
that any final agreement had been entered into.
Both the US
and Philippine governments attempt to downplay the MLSA/RP-US-01
as a "mere accounting agreement". But the controversy,
which marked the entire process, and attempts by both governments
to squelch dissent over the past ten years, completely belies this
claim. The underhanded manner by which the MLSA/RP-US-01 had been
finalized and signed could only incite the very controversy both
governments seek to avoid. Sec. Reyes's admission that Congress
was not briefed before the signing because "it might trigger
debates" provides prima facie evidence that such underhandedness
was a calculated move aimed at producing a fait accompli.
Clearly, all
this did not happen just to produce a "boring", "accounting
agreement".
Dragging
the Philippines into US Wars and Military Adventures
The
MLSA/RP-US-01 is in truth an Agreement that will commit and help
drag our country into blindly supporting US military actions, including
wars of aggression and military intervention in Asia and elsewhere.
The MLSA/RP-US-01
describes itself in Article I as an agreement "for the purpose
of establishing basic terms, conditions, and procedures to facilitate
the reciprocal provision of logistic support, supplies and services".
But it is evident from the contents of the succeeding Articles that
the basic terms, conditions, and procedures described herein include
but is not limited to accounting terms, conditions and procedures.
In conjunction
with the VFA, the MLSA/RP-US-01 is aimed at reestablishing and reinforcing
US military presence in the country and in the Southeast Asian region.
Both the VFA and MLSA/RP-US-01 are necessary for continued US intervention
in the Philippines and US power-projection in Southeast Asia.
The VFA provides
the legal framework for stationing US troops in the country and
providing them immunity from legal suits. The MLSA/RP-US-01 provides
the framework for securing the logistic support, supplies and services
for US forces stationed in the country and the region; in short,
for the establishment of foreign military facilities anew short
of returning the former US bases.
In effect, the
MLSA/RP-US-01 will decisively overturn the historic 1991 Senate
decision terminating US military presence on Philippine soil. It
flouts the constitutional provision that specifies that such kinds
of agreements on US military presence, i.e. foreign troops, facilities
and bases, require concurrence by two thirds of the Philippine Senate.
Thus Article
II of the MLSA/RP-US-01 which states that "(t)his Agreement
and any implementing Arrangements executed hereunder shall be implemented,
applied and interpreted by the Parties in accordance with the provisions
of the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement or the
Military Assistance Agreement and their respective constitutions,
national laws and regulations" is a farcical provision.
In the first
place, the MDT itself is a relic of the Cold War, and contemplates
a situation where the Philippines or US interests in the Pacific
would be attacked by the Soviet Union or China. There is currently
no threat of external attack on the Philippines, much less the US,
for the MDT to be of any relevance or application. (In the case
of the Spratleys, the US maintains a policy of neutrality and keeping
the sea-lanes free. It will not side with the Philippines in case
any of the other claimant countries threaten or attack the islands
claimed and occupied by the Philippines).
The VFA itself
is vague about the nature and duration of activities that US forces
are allowed to engage in. In our experience, these combined exercises
or Balikatan can be a series of exercises the whole year round wherein
a single exercise can last up to 6 months It can also result in
"stay-behind" US forces such as those currently still
in Basilan and other parts of Western Mindanao for so-called humanitarian
activities. Defense Secretary Gen. Angelo Reyes, in a display of
pique during the debates on Balikatan 02-1 said, "Even fifty
years is temporary."
All talk about
operations and deployments being "in accordance with the…
MDT, the VFA or MAA and respective constitutions" is nothing
but a charade.
Beyond
MDT and VFA, Grossly Unconstitutional
The MLSA/RP-US-01
clearly goes beyond the purview of the MDT and even of the VFA and
by no stretch of the imagination can it be treated as an executive
agreement that does not need Senate concurrence.
The Agreement defines the scope or applicability of "approved
activities" wherein said logistical support, supplies and services
shall be reciprocally provided by both Parties. These activities
however go beyond the purview of the Constitution and existing treaties.
1. There appears
to be a delimiting factor in that only activities "(d)uring
combined exercises and training, operations and other deployments
undertaken under the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces
Agreement or the Military Assistance Agreement as agreed upon between
the Parties" are covered by the agreement. (Art III, Sec 1-a).
However Art
III, Sec 1-a is worded vaguely enough to circumvent limitations
imposed or implied by existing bilateral agreements. The reference
to "operations and other deployments" makes the qualification
ill defined and open-ended.
It should be
pointed out that under current US military doctrine, strategy and
tactics, its military forces anywhere outside the US and US territories
are assigned a wide variety of "operations" (categorized
as "stability operations"). The overriding common objective
of these operations is to establish and project overwhelming US
military dominance in the region to deter potential rivals and fight
and decisively defeat them where deterrence fails.
The Arroyo government,
having projected itself as the staunchest ally and supporter of
the Bush "war on terror," has no qualms rushing headlong
to fight America's 'wars. As in Balikatan 02-1, this mind set has
led to wanton and wholesale violations of Philippine sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
The propensity
of US and Philippine governments and armed forces to stretch the
parameters of the MDT and VFA way beyond their scope and meaning
is borne out by past and recent experience.
A case in point
is the recent Balikatan-02-1 that was spuriously described as a
"field training exercise" (FTX) despite the use of live
ammunition, staging the exercise in actual combat areas, and engaging
in actual combat operations against the Abu Sayyaf. The entire activity
was misrepresented as being covered by the MDT despite the clear
fact that the Abu Sayyaf does not represent an external threat except
by the questionable resort to conferring it tenuous links with the
Al Qaeda and other purported terrorist groups.
2. In another
section of Art. III, Sec 1-b, the MLSA/RP-US-01 speaks of "(o)ther
cooperative efforts, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief
and rescue operations, and maritime anti-pollution operations within
Philippine territory, or outside in cases where either Party, or
both, have decided to participate. (Art III, Sec 1-b.)
Worse, the above
article provides for and opens the floodgates to Philippine involvement
in all sorts of US military adventures whether they be open declarations
of war, as in the impending US war on Iraq, or couched in terms
of "humanitarian assistance, rescue operations, etc."
since the only qualifier for these "other cooperative efforts
within Philippine territory, or outside Philippine territory"
is that "either Party, or both, have decided to participate."
On the other
side, the MLSA/RP-US-01 opens the door wide open to unhampered US
military presence and armed intervention in internal armed conflicts.
A concrete case is the recent military campaign against the Abu
Sayyaf, and the repeated pronouncements of the highest Defense and
Security officials practically inviting US forces to participate
in military campaigns against the New Peoples Army and Moro Islamic
Liberation Front. US military doctrine likewise provides for such
involvement termed as "Foreign Internal Defense Operations".
Seen in this
light, not only does the MLSA/RP-US-01 have no legal basis whatsoever
in any existing bilateral agreement, it is grossly violative of
Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity and the Philippine
Constitution.
The MLSA/RP-US-01
intrudes on national policy-making with wide-ranging and profound
consequences. At the very least it requires being subjected to public
scrutiny and debate and ratification by the Senate, rather than
negotiated and entered into by the Defense Departments of the Philippine
and US governments in secret.
Virtual
Basing
The MLSA/RP-US-01 will allow the US to access military facilities
and services in the country, which will give it the necessary freedom
of movement in pursuing its current regional and global military
objectives. The Philippines continues to play a key role in US geo-political
strategy due to its geographic location and its long history of
"special relations" with the US as a compliant ally. The
indecent haste with which the MLSA/RP-US-01 was concluded is necessitated
by the logistic requirements of the US, e.g. storage, billeting
and refueling stations, in its impending war on Iraq.
The Agreement
defines logistic support and services to include "billeting,
transportation (including airlift), communication services, medical
services, operations support (and construction and use of temporary
structures incident to operations support)… (Article IV, Section
a-2)
The qualifiers
that "storage services (for US weapons and supplies) shall
at all times be under the control and supervision of the host state"
and that structures should be "temporary" are meant to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition on US facilities. They
do not diminish the basic character of the MLSA/RP-US-01 as an agreement
that allows the provision of the same logistical support that a
regular US military base hitherto provided.
The final agreement
also has a provision that "(n)o US military base, facility
or permanent structure shall be constructed or allowed under the
agreement" (Article IV Sec.2).
Whether the
US will be allowed to construct temporary or permanent structures,
is not the issue anymore. The US will be allowed to set up structures
that they can use for the duration of "combined exercises and
training". As noted earlier, these combined exercises can occur
the whole year round, one after the other.
The provision
prohibiting "permanent military structures" is rendered
useless when taken in the context of prolonged, continuous joint
military exercises. Another way of putting it: as long as there
are exercises, the US can maintain their "temporary" structures.
Aside from building their own structures, US forces will already
be allowed access to existing Philippine facilities, making them
de facto US military facilities.
One-sided
and Open-ended
The accord
states that should there be any disagreement between the Parties
these shall not be referred to any international body or third party
(Article VIII Sec.1). Disagreements will have to be resolved by
the two Parties themselves.
This places
the country at a grievous disadvantage, given the grossly unequal
relations between the Philippines and the US, and given the latter's
track record of unilateralism, violations of international laws
as well as military abuses. This is a clear case of US bullying
and flaunting its lone superpower status.
Concretely,
the Philippines will not be able to raise future violations of the
MLSA/RP-US-01 to international venues like the United Nations or
any of its agencies, the International Court of Justice or the International
Criminal Court.
Take note that
the Parties to the MLSA/RP-US-01 are the Department of Defense of
the USA and the Department of National Defense of the Republic of
the Philippines. This puts the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
charge of Philippine Foreign policy. It must be pointed out that
the Philippine military is one of the most colonially-oriented institutions
of government given its long, continuous history of being trained
and armed by the US with the top-level Defense and AFP officials
being wooed, wined and dined, by the US military establishment.
How is it that
an agreement with significant defense and foreign policy implications
are left to the sole discretion of military officers?
The MLSA/RP-US-01
rides roughshod over safeguards and limitations imposed by treaties
and Philippine constitutional & legal processes. It is idle
to talk about "control and supervision of the host state"
without explicit provisions… and when the Philippine government
readily submits to US positions (e.g. VFA non-inspection of vessels
and surrender of judicial jurisdiction over violations of Philippine
law committed by US troops in Philippine territory).
Should there
be any violations and damage to property or human life, the US can
always invoke the VFA whereby the Philippines will surrender criminal
jurisdiction over US troops who have committed violations.
While the agreement
prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons (Article III Sec.5), there
is no provision, which prohibits the entry and storage of nuclear,
chemical or biological weapons, nor is there any provision, which
allows the inspection of these weapons in US vessels. The agreement
already assumes compliance with existing Philippine laws that prohibit
the entry, storage and projection from Philippine territory of nuclear
weapons.
The open-endedness
of the MLSA/RP-US-01 is further underscored by Art. V, Sec. 3 which
says that "An Implementing Arrangement under this Agreement
may be negotiated on behalf of the U.S. Department of Defense by
Headquarters, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) … (and) the Department
of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines by General Headquarters,
Armed Forces of the Philippines". This reveals that MLSA/RP-US-01
is indeed only the beginning since "implementing arrangements"
are still to follow, negotiated and signed only by defense and/or
military officials and likely not to be revealed much less brought
to the attention of the public.
In Art. V, Sec.
1 on the terms and conditions of the agreement, while the provision
begins by saying that "(e)ach party shall exert best efforts,
consistent with national priorities, to satisfy requests from the
other Party under this Agreement…" it ends with the following:
"When an Implementing Arrangement contains a stricter standard
for satisfying such requests, it shall apply over this paragraph."
This provision can be interpreted as mandatory and invoked by the
US to demand the satisfaction of certain logistical support requirements.
Reciprocal provisions
in the agreement give the Philippines the opportunity to also avail
of logistics support from the US. Of course, that is assuming that
the Philippines would want to go all the way to the other side of
the globe to have its ships repaired and refueled and its personnel
billeted in US military facilities. Realistically speaking, the
Philippines will not likely make use of this reciprocal provision
since it does not conduct large-scale overseas military operations,
which would require the hosting of US military bases. For all intents
and purposes, the MLSA/RP-US-01 will benefit only the US military.
US Power
Projection and Military Intervention
After
the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, the US government
has stepped up its drive for war and hegemony, which included the
bombing of Afghanistan and military incursions in Central Asia and
the Middle East. Using the specter of terrorism as a convenient
justification, the US is trying to expand and protect its imperialist
interests and heighten the exploitation and oppression of the peoples
of the world.
Taken in the
context of the US "war against terror" and announcements
from the US State Department declaring the Communist Party of the
Philippines-NPA as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, the MLSA/RP-US-01
is an instrument for US military intervention in the domestic affairs
of the Philippines. The MLSA/RP-US-01 will allow the US military
to have a stable and flexible forward presence in the country and
the region, and at less cost compared to maintaining the usual US
basing structures like Clark and Subic.
The MLSA/RP-US-01
should also be viewed in the light of the recently concluded US-sponsored
ASEAN anti-terror pact which aims to strengthen security cooperation
against "terrorism" in defense of US interests in Southeast
Asia. The MLSA/RP-US-01 will make the Philippines a staging ground
for US "stability operations" (military intervention)
in Southeast Asia. It is a reprise of the role played by Clark and
Subic during the Vietnam and Korean Wars.
We also have
to be wary about Article VIII Sec.3 that, in effect, authorizes
classified activities or operations under the agreement. This is
cleverly done in the guise of disallowing classified-level transactions
while incorporating the qualifier "(u)nless specifically authorized
by separate agreement or arrangement…" This could very
well be used by the US to launch covert operations in the country,
something that the US is certainly capable of doing.
With the VFA
and MLSA/RP-US-01 in place, the US is fast regaining the privileges
it enjoyed during the period of US military bases in the country.
Though short of having formal bases, the US is hoping to expand
its presence and engagement in the Philippines and the region.
Call ti All
Patriotic Filipinos
The MLSA/RP-US-01
is a grossly one-sided agreement aimed at expanding US military
engagement and presence in the country. The public has been hoodwinked
several times over by the Arroyo administration's failure to provide
full public disclosure regarding the agreement. The historic verdict
of the people, as expressed by the Senate's decision to junk the
Military Bases Agreement in 1991, has been reversed by the executive
and by a handful of militarists in the administration.
National sovereignty
and territorial integrity are being sold out in exchange for vague
promises of paltry sums of economic and military aid, which are
not even provided for in the Agreement, and for continued US backing
for the incumbent regime. Thanks to the shameless and flagrant puppetry
of the Arroyo government, our country has been virtually reduced
to Uncle Sam's Southeast Asian colonial outpost for US interventionist
wars.
All patriotic
Filipinos must unite and resolutely oppose the MLSA/RP-US-01. There
is nothing mutual in this Agreement, absolutely nothing.
The Arroyo government
should be held responsible and be made accountable for signing this
grossly disadvantageous Agreement and for surrendering national
sovereignty. Thus Pres. Arroyo has made it so much easier for the
country to be dragged into wars not of our making and not to our
national interest. Vice versa the Arroyo government must be held
accountable for thus exposing our people to attacks directed at
the US, its forces and installations.
Let us uphold
the people's aspirations for national sovereignty and a truly independent
foreign policy. Let us oppose increasing US armed intervention in
and impositions on our country.
For
comments and reactions to this article, please visit Tinig.com
Forums.
|