LATHALAIN
Terrorism: Towards
a Legal Definition
By
Soliman M. Santos, Jr.
Kaiba
News and Features
SEPTEMBER 11
has brought to the fore the issue of international terrorism and
with it the question of its very definition. Malaysian journalist
Bunn Nagara of The Star, writing on the Special Session
of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) on 1-3 April
2002 in Kuala Lumpur which failed to reach a consensus on the definition
of terrorism, said: "For the international community to do
anything resolutely against terrorism, policymakers have to move
on. And the best step forward is to begin by defining terrorism.
This is a logical first step, much as a physician has to diagnose
a patient before prescribing the appropriate treatment."
Similarly, the
International Progress Organization (IPO), in The Baku Declaration
on Global Dialogue and Peaceful Co-Existence Among Nations and the
Threats Posed by International Terrorism of 9 November 2001,
said: "The United Nations Organization should urgently convene
an international conference with the aim of establishing a precise
and legally sound definition of terrorism. Unless this effort at
codification is undertaken, the term 'terrorism' will continue to
serve only as a tool to justify brute power politics and obfuscate
the superpower policy of double standards."
A Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism, including a definition of
terrorism, has so far been elusive in the UN, as shown most recently
in the November 2001 sessions of the General Assembly's Sixth Committee
(Legal Affairs) and Ad Hoc Committee tasked to elaborate an international
convention for the suppression of terrorist bombings. This has been
attributed, among others, to "diverging political interests
and contradicting normative perceptions" especially between
Islamic states and Western states. This, notwithstanding the fact
that the UN has 12 existing multilateral conventions on terrorism.
But none of
these 12 conventions has a generally accepted single inclusive definition
of terrorism. International Law Commission (ILC) member Raul I.
Goco of the Philippines points out that each of these conventions,
which relates to various aspects of the problem, describes only
the particular or specific acts or subject-matter covered by it.
These are aircraft hijacking and sabotage, crimes against internationally
protected persons including diplomatic agents, hostage-taking, physical
protection of nuclear material, airport violence, acts against maritime
navigation safety, acts against the safety of fixed platforms on
the continental shelf, terrorist bombings, and terrorist financing-so
far.
American professors Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, in their
book International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the UN Charter
Paradigm (1993), note that a 1983 study by Dutch political
scientist Alex Schmid found that 109 definitions of terrorism have
been advanced between 1936 and 1981. More have appeared since then,
including at least six from the U.S. government. Thus, one Professor
Levitt said that the search for an authoritative definition "in
some ways resembles the Quest for the Holy Grail." Given the
confusion, some legal scholars have advocated simply dropping the
use of the term.
This is why
some human rights groups like Amnesty International do not use the
term "terrorism". They say that in practice it is used
to describe quite different conduct. States describe acts or political
motivations that they oppose as "terrorist," while rejecting
the use of the term when it relates to activities or causes they
support.
"Unfortunately,"
say Arend and Beck, "the problematic term 'terrorism' like
the complicated phenomenon it seeks to describe, will almost certainly
persist." Not to engage in a struggle of definition, however,
is to lose by default to the hegemony of definition by the vested
powers behind the current "global war against terrorism."
Fortunately,
some insightful thoughts in recent years might help shorten this
"Quest for the Holy Grail." Arend and Beck themselves
proposed "a working definition, one which characterizes both
the terrorist act and the terrorist actor"
rather than terrorism. They said a terrorist act is distinguished
by at least three specific qualities:
a. violence, whether actual or threatened;
b. a 'political' objective, however conceived; and
c. an intended audience, typically though not exclusively
a wide one.
Hence, Arend
and Beck define an "act of terrorism" as "the
threat or use of violence with the intent of causing fear in a target
group, in order to achieve political objectives." A more
sophisticated version of this definition is "the threat or
actual use of violence to create extreme fear or anxiety in a target
group in order to coerce it to meet certain political or quasi-political
objectives."
As for terrorist
actors, whether individuals or groups, Arend and Beck categorized
them by the strength of their association to states:
a. those without state toleration, support or sponsorship;
b. those with state toleration, but without state support
or sponsorship;
c. those with state support, but without immediate state
sponsorship;
d. those with state sponsorship.
To this we might
add "those which are states." As has been noted, states
are just as capable of committing terrorist acts as are non-state
armed groups.
But Nicholas
Howen, the new Regional Director for Asia-Pacific of the Office
of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, in a paper for the
International Council on Human Rights Policy in January 2002, says
that "The problem in the UN is that states focus too much on
who could be labeled a terrorist rather than what a terrorist
act looks like… States could perhaps agree on a definition
of terrorism if they limited it to attacks, aimed at civilians,
that spread terror. This would in effect apply to peacetime the
existing prohibitions in international humanitarian law of attacks
on civilians during armed conflicts." The elements of targeting
civilians as well as spreading terror are what are
missing in the Arend and Beck definition of terrorism.
The idea that
international humanitarian law (IHL) "can provide guidance
to the legal approach to terrorism in peacetime" was first
broached by the long-time editor of the International Review
of the Red Cross Hans-Peter Gasser as early as 1985 in a paper
entitled "Prohibition of terrorist acts in international humanitarian
law." And then Schmid in his 1992 report to the UN Crime Prevention
Office suggested that an act of terrorism be considered as a "peacetime
equivalent of a war crime."
And so, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, in his addresses to the General Assembly on 1 October
2001 and to the Security Council on 12 November 2001, while acknowledging
the definition of terrorism as one of the most difficult issues
before the UN, nevertheless referred to IHL according to which "even
in situations of armed conflict, the targeting of innocent civilians
is illegal." Austrian Professor Hans Koechler, in his Fourteenth
Centenary Lecture at the Philippine Supreme Court on 12 March 2002,
refers to this allusion to IHL as "a useful hint as to how
to bridge the gap between the opposing schools of thought concerning
the definition of terrorism as a crime."
Koechler then
proposes what he calls a comprehensive or unified approach: In a
universal and at the same time unified system of norms-ideally to
be created as an extension of existing legal instruments-there should
be corresponding sets of rules (a) penalizing deliberate attacks
on civilians or civilian infrastructure in wartime (as covered by
the Geneva Conventions), and (b) penalizing deliberate attacks on
civilians in peacetime (covered by the 12 so far anti-terrorist
conventions). He says "Such a harmonization of the basic legal
rules related to politically motivated violent acts against civilians
would make it legally consistent also to include the term 'state
terrorism' in the general definition of terrorism."
As regards the
dilemma between terrorism and national liberation movements (which
have the international legal right to use force in the exercise
of their people's right of self-determination against colonial domination,
alien occupation or racist regimes), Koechler further explains:
"Through such a comprehensive codification effort it could
be made clear that resistance or national liberation movements must
in no way resort to terrorist tactics and that a (politically eventually
legitimate) aim does not necessarily justify the means (or any means
for that matter). In the general framework of a unified system of
international humanitarian law, terrorist methods will be punishable
irrespective of the specific political purpose and irrespective
of whether those acts are committed by liberation movements or regular
armies."
In other words,
as a rule, no national liberation movement or rebel group
should be a priori exempted or condemned of culpability for terrorism
by mere reason of its status as national liberation movement or
rebel group. Each and every act in question of the organization
must be examined on a case to case basis whether it qualifies as
a terrorist act. As an exception, only if there is a clear
and consistent pattern, plan or policy (in short, something
systematic) of terrorist acts or methods by the organization
would it be justified to designate it as a "terrorist organization."
One terrorist act does not necessarily make a terrorist organization,
unless the act is based on a policy of employing terrorist acts
(for example, a policy of suicide-bombing targeting innocent civilians,
or a policy of reprisal aerial bombing or artillery/tank shelling
targeting the civilian mass base of the enemy).
IHL itself
uses the term "terrorism," "acts of terrorism,"
"measures…of terrorism," and "terror."
So there should not be any shying away from these terms. Rather,
IHL may yet help establish a precise and legally sound definition
of terrorism to obviate its being used as a political weapon by
vested powers. The Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, Article 33
makes reference to "measures…of terrorism." The
1977 Additional Protocol II Relating to the Protection of Victims
of Non-International Armed Conflicts, Article 4, paragraph 2(d)
makes reference to "acts of terrorism."
But it is the
1977 Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, Article 51, paragraph 2 and the
identical Article 13, paragraph 2 of Protocol II which may be said
to elaborate on the term "terrorism" and thus provide
a core legal framework for a definition of terrorism. The said identical
provisions for both international and non-international armed conflicts
read as follows:
"The
civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall
not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population
are prohibited."
From this provision
for situations of armed conflict, one can draw some elements for
a legal definition of terrorism in peacetime:
a. making civilians the object of attack (deliberately targeting
civilians)
b. acts or threats of violence or use of weapons
c. primary purpose of spreading terror or extreme fear
among the civilian population
Of course, we
should add two elements from the Arend and Beck concept of terrorist
act:
d. political or even quasi-political objective (to distinguish
it from criminal madness)
e. intended audience (not necessarily the target civilians).
But the most
important element is still the civilian target. Malaysia's
definition of terrorism at the OIC Special Session shifts the defining
element to the target rather than the source of the violence. Stated
otherwise, it is seeing terror from the victim's point of view.
Of course, aside from the deliberate targeting of the civilian population
and individual civilians, there can also be deliberate targeting
of civilian objects or infrastructure to spread terror
among the civilian population.
The element
of spreading terror is also important as a distinguishing
feature, if not the very essence, of terrorism. Thus, the ILC's
1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
defines international terrorism as "undertaking, organizing,
assisting, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts [by an agent
of a State] against another State directed at persons or property
and of such a nature as to create a state of terror in the minds
of public figures, groups of persons or the general public…"
(italics supplied) Understandably, this definition, from the
viewpoint of states, does not limit itself to civilian targets.
Some writers
emphasize coercion to force the granting of political demands. But
this is not always the case. In many cases, the act of terrorism
is just a political statement without any demands. September 11
was certainly in that mold. One aspect of intended audience is the
accompanying publicity, considered an essential factor in terrorist
strategy.
Putting everything
together now, one might come up with this core legal definition
of terrorism: the systematic employment by states, groups or individuals
of acts or threats of violence or use of weapons deliberately targeting
the civilian population, individuals or infrastructure for the primary
purpose of spreading terror or extreme fear among the civilian population
in relation to some political or quasi-political objective and undertaken
with an intended audience.
We hope this
attempt at a single inclusive definition of terrorism helps "the
Quest for the Holy Grail." The sooner we achieve a precise
and legally sound definition of terrorism, the better for the international
community to act on the issue of terrorism. Only with adherence
to the international rule of law can we hope for no more September
11s and other acts of terrorism. Let's roll with the rule of law,
not the role of force
-----------------
The author is a Bicolano lawyer, peace advocate and legal scholar.
He is the author of two recent books, The Moro Islamic Challenge:
Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (University
of the Philippines Press, 2001) and Peace Advocate: 50 Selected
Writings, 1986-1997 (De La Salle University Press, 2002).
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